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When bad stress goes good: increased threat reactivity 
predicts improved category learning performance 
Shawn W. Ell, Brandon Cosley, Shannon L. McCoy 
 
Abstract The way in which we respond to everyday stressors can have a profound impact on 
cognitive functioning. Maladaptive stress responses in particular are generally associated with 
impaired cognitive performance. We argue, however, that the cognitive system mediating task 
performance is also a critical determinant of the stress-cognition relationship. Consistent with 
this prediction, we observed that stress reactivity consistent with a maladaptive, threat response 
differentially predicted performance on two categorization tasks. Increased threat reactivity 
predicted enhanced performance on an information-integration task (i.e., learning is thought to 
depend upon a procedural-based memory system), and a (non-significant) trend for impaired 
performance on a rule-based task (i.e., learning is thought to depend upon a hypothesis-testing 
system). These data suggest that it is critical to consider both variability in the stress response 
and variability in the cognitive system mediating task performance in order to fully understand 
the stress-cognition relationship. 
Keywords Category learning, Implicit/explicit memory 
Introduction  
The stressors we encounter in our daily lives 
can have a profound negative impact on 
cognitive performance. A critical determinant 
of the stress-cognition relationship may be 
variability in the extent to which individuals 
respond to stressors in a manner that is 
adaptive (appraising a stressor as a 
challenge) or maladaptive (appraising a 
stressor as a threat) (Blascovich & Tomaka, 
1996; Dienstbier, 1989; McEwen & Sapolsky, 
1995). Adaptive stress responses have 
generally been associated with enhanced 
cognitive performance whereas maladaptive 
stress responses have generally been 
associated with impaired cognitive 
performance (e.g., Blascovich, Mendes, 
Hunter, & Salomon, 1999). However, might 
there be aspects of cognition for which a 
maladaptive stress response is actually 
adaptive? Given the diverse nature of 
cognition, it is likely that any stress-related 
change in performance depends upon the 
cognitive systems that are being recruited to 
perform the particular task. This raises the 
intriguing possibility that maladaptive stress 
responses may lead to enhanced cognitive 
performance if the appropriate cognitive 
system is recruited. 
Stress-response variability and cognition 
Clearly there are many types of stressors one 
might encounter, but our focus is on a 
ubiquitous stressor in modern life: social 
evaluation. Performance situations in which 
we are evaluated by others in a domain of 
personal importance, and are motivated to do 
well, elicit a physiological and psychological 
stress response (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). 
The vast majority of the stress-cognition 
literature focuses on the relationship between 
the intensity of this stress response and the 
cognitive system mediating task performance. 
These studies generally find that increased 
stress is associated with impaired cognitive 
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performance on tasks taxing working memory 
and declarative memory (Lupien, Maheu, Tu, 
Fiocco, & Schramek, 2007). There are, 
however, numerous reports of increased 
stress being associated with enhanced 
cognition (e.g., Smeets, Giesbrecht, Jelicic, & 
Merckelbach, 2007). Although this literature is 
important in demonstrating that the impact of 
stress may depend upon the cognitive system 
mediating performance, interpretation is 
complicated by tasks differing in the nature of 
the information that is learned (e.g., verbal vs. 
nonverbal), the role of awareness (e.g., 
implicit vs. explicit - Graf & Schacter, 1985), 
the processing requirements (e.g., data driven 
vs. conceptually driven - Roediger, 1990) and 
the nature of the stress response. Variability 
in the extent to which individuals experience 
an adaptive or maladaptive stress response is 
likely to affect the stress-cognition 
relationship. Whether the stress response is 
adaptive or maladaptive depends critically 
upon an individual’s appraisal of the situation 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). – that is, whether 
individuals are challenged or threatened by 
the stressor (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). 
Physiologically, both responses activate the 
sympathetic-adrenal-medullary axis and result 
in increases in heart rate and left ventricular 
contractility. Adaptive responses are marked 
by appraising the stressor as a challenge and 
increased cardiovascular efficiency: increased 
cardiac output (CO) and decreased total 
peripheral resistance (TPR). In contrast, 
maladaptive responses are characterized by 
appraising the stressor as a threat and 
decreased cardiovascular efficiency. Due to 
activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal (HPA) axis, vasodilation is attenuated 
in threat leading to decreased, or little change 
in, CO and increased TPR (Blascovich, 2008). 
Increased threat reactivity is associated with 
worse cognitive performance than challenge 
(Blascovich et al., 1999; Kassam, Koslov, & 
Mendes, 2009). Although these studies are 
important in demonstrating that variability in 
the nature of the stress response is an 
important determinant of the stress-cognition 
relationship, they are limited in that they 
ignore variability in the cognitive system 
mediating performance. We argue that both 
variability in the nature of the stress response 
and variability in the cognitive system 
mediating task performance should be 
considered in order to fully understand the 
stress-cognition relationship. We focus on a 
specific type of cognitive task: category 
learning (i.e., the process of establishing a 
memory trace that improves the efficiency of 
assigning novel objects to different groups). 
Category learning is a particularly useful 
paradigm given our goals because there is 
extensive evidence suggesting that 
processing can be biased towards different 
cognitive systems by simply manipulating the 
structure of the categories without any 
changes in how the dependent measure (i.e., 
the categorization response) is assessed 
(Ashby & Maddox, 2005). By using 
categorization, we can examine whether the 
relationship between threat and performance 
depends upon the system that is recruited 
and avoid the aforementioned limitations of 
previous studies investigating the stress-
cognition relationship. 
Categorization as a model task 
To begin, consider the information-integration 
(II) categories in Fig. 1a. Learning in II tasks is 
thought to be mediated by a procedural-
learning system that incrementally acquires 
associations between stimuli and the 
appropriate categorization response (Ashby, 
Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998). 
Learning in rule-based (RB) tasks (Fig. 1b), in 
contrast, is thought to be mediated by a 
hypothesis-testing system that learns to 
attend to the relevant dimension (i.e., bar 
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width) and the optimal placement of the 
decision criterion on the relevant dimension 
(Ashby et al., 1998). The hypothesis-testing 
system, unlike the procedural- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
learning system, is highly dependent upon 
working memory and executive functions 
(e.g., Waldron & Ashby, 2001). Increased 
threat (as indexed by increased HPA axis 
activation) is associated with impaired 
performance on working memory tasks (e.g., 
Schoofs, Preub, & Wolf, 2008). Therefore, 
increased threat reactivity would be expected 
to impair the hypothesis-testing system, 
resulting in reduced accuracy on a RB task. 
Importantly, the hypothesis-testing and 
procedural-based systems are hypothesized 
to operate in parallel, and compete for control 
of the observable categorization response 
across trials (Ashby et al., 1998). Initially, the 
hypothesis-testing system is in control, but 
control will generally shift in favor of the 
procedural-based system in II tasks (e.g., Ell 
& Ashby, 2006). Because of this competition, 
manipulations designed to interfere with the 
hypothesis-testing system can actually 
facilitate learning in II tasks (De Caro, 
Thomas, & Beilock, 2008; Maddox, Love, 
Glass, & Filoteo, 2008; Markman, Maddox, & 
Worthy, 2006; Worthy, Markman, & Maddox 
2009). Thus, increased threat reactivity would 
be expected to facilitate the procedural-based 
system, resulting in enhanced accuracy on an 
II task. 
Method 
Overview 
As previous research has demonstrated that 
category learning tasks in and of themselves 
are unlikely to be physiologically arousing 
(Blascovich et al., 1999), we first subjected all 
participants to a social stressor in order to 
induce physiological arousal (and allow 
differentiation of challenge and threat 
reactivity) that would carry over into the 
category learning task. Immediately following 
the stressor, participants were randomly 
assigned to complete either the II or RB task. 
Fig. 1  Information-integration and b rule-based and 
category structures. Each point in the graph represents a 
Gabor pattern (i.e., a sine-wave grating in which contrast 
is modulated by a circular Gaussian filter) of a particular 
spatial frequency (bar width) and orientation (bar angle). 
Open circles represent category A stimuli and filled 
squares represent category B stimuli. The solid line is the 
decision strategy that would maximize accuracy (i.e., 
optimal decision strategy). The insets are example Gabor 
patterns. On each trial of the experiment, a stimulus was 
displayed and the participant pressed a key (labeled “A” or 
“B”) indicating category membership. Immediately 
following the response, corrective feedback was given. 
The participants were instructed that at first they would be 
guessing, but to use the corrective feedback to help them 
learn the correct classification by trial-and-error. The tasks 
and procedure were adapted from Markman et al. (2006) 
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We hypothesized that the more threatened 
participants were the better they would 
perform on the II task and the worse they 
would perform on the RB task. Specifically, 
we predicted that increases in stress 
appraisals, increases in TPR and decreases 
in CO would be associated with better 
performance on the II task and worse 
performance on the RB task.  
Participants and procedure  
Participants (n = 33, 31 female, Age: M = 
22.70; SD = 7.16) arrived for a study on 
“Health and Performance” and sensors to 
monitor cardiovascular and hemodynamic 
reactivity were applied (ECG: 
electrocardiogram, ICG: impedance 
cardiogram, BP: continual blood pressure). 
Participants then relaxed for a 5 min baseline.  
Social stressor To induce physiological 
arousal, participants performed a modified 
version of the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST - 
Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Helhammer, 1993) in 
front of two evaluators (one female, one male) 
trained to display flat affect and neutral facial 
expression throughout the test. Participants 
met the evaluators, the task instructions were 
explained, and they were left alone to prepare 
for 5 min (anticipatory stress). The evaluators 
returned and guided the participant in speech 
(5 min), interview (5 min), and serial 
subtraction (5 min) tasks.  
Threat appraisal To assess the extent to 
which participants found the social stressor 
threatening, we asked participants (during the 
social stressor, following speech preparation) 
the extent to which they found it: stressful, 
demanding, effortful, and distressing. 
Responses were made on a 0 (not at all) to 6 
(very much) scale and were averaged to form 
a reliable index of threat appraisal (α = .87). 
Categorization tasks Immediately following 
the stressor, participants were randomly 
assigned to complete five 80- trial blocks in 
either the II or RB categorization task (see 
Fig. 1 for details). 
Cardiovascular reactivity measures ECG, ICG 
and BP data were recorded using BioPac 
hardware and analyzed with BioPac’s 
AcqKnowledge software. We calculated the 
average for heart rate (HR), CO (stroke 
volume X heart rate), and TPR (80 X mean 
arterial pressure/cardiac output) during 
baseline (last 4 min), the stressor (15 task 
min), and the category learning task (first 5 
min).1 We then created reactivity scores by 
subtracting baseline from the stressor and 
category learning averages. Thus, positive 
numbers indicate a rise in HR, TPR or CO 
while negative numbers indicate a decline.  
Results  
Preliminary analyses  
Prior to testing our hypotheses we first 
needed to establish: (1) that our social 
stressor was indeed stressful, and (2) that 
there was not a failure of random assignment 
(i.e., differences in cardiovascular reactivity at 
baseline, during the stressor, or during 
category learning).  
Was the social stressor equivalently stressful? 
Participants in both the II and RB tasks 
appraised the stressor as equivalently 
threatening [t(31) = 1.61, p = .12], rating it 
above the midpoint of the scale (overall M = 
3.92, SD = 1.28). We also observed 
significant increases in heart rate over 
																																								 																				
1	The	first	minute	of	baseline	was	often	contaminated	by	calibration	
and	was	excluded.	We	focus	on	the	first	5	min	of	the	categorization	
task	because	cardiovascular	responses	recover	relatively	quickly	
from	stress	(Linden,	Earle,	Gerin,	&	Christenfeld,	1997).	The	
relationships	between	physiological	variables	and	accuracy	do	not	
change	if	we	look	at	individual	minutes	(e.g.,	from	1	to	10	min)	
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baseline during the stressor [M = 90.10, SD = 
13.10; Baseline: M = 72.90, SD = 10.80; F(1, 
26) = 116.8, p < 0.05] a pre-requisite for 
examining patterns of challenge and threat. 
Heart rate remained elevated above baseline 
during the categorization tasks [M = 78.10, 
SD = 12.70; F (1, 26) = 22.20, p < 0.05]. 
Finally, we did not observe any differences 
between the II and RB tasks on HR, CO, or 
TPR at baseline, during the stressor, or 
during the categorization task (all t’s < 
│1.30│, p’s > 0.20). 
Hypothesis testing  
We utilized moderated regression analyses to 
test the hypothesis that the relationship 
between threat and accuracy would differ by 
categorization task. Task performance was 
assessed as the average percent correct 
across the five blocks.2 Separate analyses 
were conducted for our different threat 
indices: threat appraisals, TPR reactivity 
during the categorization task, and CO 
reactivity during the categorization task. On 
step 1 we entered the main effects of task 
(RB = 0; II = 1) and threat index (centered at 
the mean). On step 2, we entered the 
interaction between task and threat index.3 
Significant interactions were followed up by 
examining the significance of the simple slope 
for the II and RB tasks. The simple slopes 
and intercepts were derived from the overall 
model (Aiken & West, 1991) and graphed 
using estimated values at high (1 SD above 
the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) 
values of the reactivity measures.  
																																								 																				
2	For	simplicity,	we	focus	on	accuracy	averaged	across	blocks.	
Analyzing	the	data	focusing	on	alternative	accuracy	measures	(e.g.,	
accuracy	during	the	first	block)	did	not	alter	the	pattern	of	the	
results	
3	Analyzing	the	data	controlling	for	baseline	physiological	values	
(Wilder,	1962)	did	not	change	the	pattern	of	results.	Note	that	the	
degrees	of	freedom	for	our	dependent	variables	fluctuate	slightly	
due	to	missing	data	and	signal	artifact	
Threat appraisal Consistent with previous 
research, overall accuracy was higher on the 
RB task (M = 77.98, SD = 8.76) than the II 
task [M = 63.43, SD = 7.24; β = –.66, p < 
0.001; Step 1: R2 = .47; F(2, 30) = 13.56, p < 
0.001]. There was no main effect of threat 
appraisals on accuracy (β = .08, p > 0.50). 
Consistent with hypotheses, the relationship 
between threat appraisal and accuracy 
depended upon the categorization task [β = 
.52, p < 0.01; ΔR2 = .12; F(1, 29) = 8.59, p < 
0.001; See Fig. 2]. Threat appraisals were 
significantly associated with enhanced 
accuracy on the II task (β = .41, p < 0.05) and 
impaired accuracy (although not significantly 
so) on the RB task (β = –.31, p = 0.09).  
TPR As in the previous analysis the main 
effect of task was significant while the main 
effect of TPR was not [β = .15, p = .26; Step 
1: R2 = .65; F(2, 21) = 19.36, p < 0.001]. 
Consistent with hypotheses, the relationship 
between TPR reactivity and accuracy 
depended upon the categorization task [β = 
.41; Step 2: ΔR2 = .06, F(1, 20) = 4.36, p = 
.05; see Fig. 3]. Recall that increases in TPR 
during the categorization task are consistent 
with threat. In the II task, the more TPR 
increased the higher the accuracy (β = .71, p 
< 0.01). In contrast, TPR was not significantly 
associated with accuracy on the RB task (β = 
–.22, p = .51).  
CO. As with the previous analyses only the 
main effect of task was significant on Step 1 
[CO: β = –.14, p = .26; R2 = .71; F(2, 21) = 
25.13, p < 0.01]. Consistent with hypotheses, 
the relationship between CO reactivity and 
accuracy depended upon the categorization 
task [β = –.47; Step 2: ΔR2 = .06, F(1, 20) = 
4.75, p = 0.04; see Fig. 4]. Recall that 
decreases in CO during the categorization 
task are consistent with threat. In the II task, 
the more CO decreased the higher the 
accuracy (β = –.67, p = 0.02). In contrast, CO 
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was not significantly associated with accuracy 
on the RB task (β = .33, p = 0.33). 
 
 
 
 
 
Model-based analyses Given the finding that 
increased threat reactivity was associated 
with higher accuracy on the II task, we next 
examined whether increased threat reactivity 
also predicted the use of more optimal 
decision strategies on the II task. To test this 
hypothesis, we fit three types of decision-
bound models to the last block of data from 
each participant (see Maddox & Ashby, 1993 
for details of the models and fitting 
procedures). One type of model assumed that 
participants used a task appropriate, 
information-integration strategy (e.g., the solid 
line in Fig. 1). Two types of models assumed 
that participants used a task inappropriate 
strategy: either a rule-based strategy (e.g., 
the solid line in Fig. 1) or guessing. Next, we 
computed the point-biserial correlation 
between the best-fitting model type (task 
appropriate or inappropriate) and each of the 
three reactivity measures. For all three 
measures, the results were consistent with 
predictions. The more threatened participants 
were, the more they utilized task appropriate 
strategies on the II task [Threat Appraisal: r 
(18) = .66, p < 0.01; TPR: r (13) = .57, p < 
0.05; CO: r (13) = –.48, p = 0.09). In sum, 
increased threat reactivity was associated 
with enhanced accuracy and task appropriate 
strategy use on the II task.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
The present study demonstrates the first 
evidence, to our knowledge, that a 
maladaptive threat response is associated 
with enhanced performance on a cognitive 
task. We found a consistent pattern of 
enhanced performance across three different 
markers of threat in response to a 
psychosocial stressor: threat appraisals, TPR 
reactivity, and CO reactivity. Our predictions 
were motivated by the hypothesis that 
category learning is mediated in part by a 
Fig. 2	Average percent correct as a function of 
the categorization task and threat appraisals	
Fig.	3	Average	percent	correct	as	a	function	of	the	
categorization	task	and	total	peripheral	resistance	
reactivity	 Fig.	4	Average	percent	correct	as	a	function	of	the	
categorization	task	and	cardiac	output	reactivity	
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competition between hypothesis-testing and 
procedural-based systems (Ashby et al., 
1998). We proposed that threat impairs the 
hypothesis-testing system, and consequently, 
should lead to enhanced performance on II 
tasks that recruit the procedural-based 
system. In contrast, RB tasks recruit the 
hypothesis-testing system and therefore 
performance should be impaired by threat. 
Although there was a trend for increased 
threat appraisals and reactivity to predict 
impaired performance on the RB task, these 
results were not statistically significant. The 
hypothesis-testing system recruited for RB 
tasks is constrained to use rules that are 
easily verbalizable and, as a consequence, 
cannot learn II tasks. Computationally, the 
procedural-based system uses a 
nonparametric classifier that is capable of 
mimicking any linear decision boundary (e.g., 
the strital pattern classifier - Ashby & 
Waldron, 1999). Thus, in contrast to the 
hypothesis-testing system, the procedural-
based system is far more flexible during 
learning and, therefore, can eventually learn 
both RB and IItasks (Ashby et al., 1998). 
Thus, even though competition would predict 
that the hypothesis-testing system is inhibiting 
the procedural-based system on the RB task, 
increased threat reactivity may have offset 
this inhibition thereby providing a 
compensatory mechanism for learning on the 
RB task and weakening the association 
between threat and accuracy. It is also 
possible that the absence of threat-related 
effects in the RB task is related to 
methodological issues. For instance, it may 
be that RB tasks in which a single, 
unidimensional decision criterion must be 
learned do not place sufficient demands on 
working memory resources (Ell, Ing, & 
Maddox, 2009) for the effect of increased 
threat reactivity to be detected. Alternatively, 
the impact of threat reactivity on RB tasks 
may be less robust than on II tasks and 
require greater statistical power to detect. An 
attractive feature of our design is that it 
enabled us to examine the consequences of 
acute stress reactivity as it carried over into 
the subsequent cognitive task. This approach 
to investigating the stress-cognition 
relationship mimics many real-world situations 
(e.g., performing your job after a stressful 
meeting with your supervisor). A potential 
consequence of our design is that the 
categorization task, and not the stress test, 
was driving the stress response. It is unlikely, 
however, that the categorization task itself 
would induce arousal (i.e., an increase in 
heart rate) let alone a pattern of threat 
reactivity. For example, participants 
performing a categorization task in the 
absence of social evaluation demonstrated no 
appreciable cardiovascular reactivity from 
baseline (Blascovich et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, one could argue that because 
the II task was more difficult it was also more 
threatening. Importantly, however, we did not 
observe any differences in physiological 
reactivity between the two categorization 
tasks. We elected to use a correlational 
design to investigate whether threat would 
predict increased cognitive performance. Now 
that this relationship has been demonstrated, 
future work could seek to manipulate threat 
vs. challenge patterns of physiological 
reactivity and examine the consequences for 
cognitive performance. It should be noted, 
however, that while contexts can be created 
that are more or less likely to elicit threat 
responses, individual variability in the stress 
response is likely to remain. For instance, 
even though we utilized a classic stressor 
known to activate the HPA axis (Kirschbaum 
et al., 1993), we still observed substantial 
variability in stress response. Future work will 
also manipulate the point at which 
participants experience the stressor. For 
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example, would increased threat reactivity 
post-acquisition benefit performance during a 
delayed retention test (see Koessler, Engler, 
Riether, & Kissler, 2009 for a related 
approach in memory retrieval)? In sum, we 
report the novel finding that a maladaptive 
threat response predicts enhanced 
performance on a cognitive task. Importantly, 
our results suggest that it is critical to consider 
how individual differences in the nature of the 
stress response interact with the cognitive 
system mediating task performance. Studies 
focusing on variability in the nature of the 
stress response have found that threat is 
associated with impaired cognitive 
performance (e.g., Blascovich et al., 1999; 
Kassam et al., 2009). Studies focusing on 
variability in the cognitive system mediating 
task performance have found inconsistent 
effects of the impact of stress on different 
cognitive systems (Lupien et al., 2007). 
Although this literature does consider 
variability in the magnitude of the stressor 
(Sapolsky, 2004) or magnitude of the stress 
response (Lupien et al., 2007), there is little 
consideration of the nature of the stress 
response (i.e., challenge vs. threat). Indeed, 
individual differences in the stress response 
may help explain the inconsistent results 
across studies investigating the 
stresscognition relationship. Importantly, this 
interdisciplinary approach opens up new 
avenues of investigation for both 
psychophysiologists and cognitive scientists 
interested in understanding the stress-
cognition relationship. 
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